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ABSTRACT 
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON-POOL 





The literature on community based natural resource management largely focuses on 
developing conditions that enable self-organized groups of resource users to collectively 
manage common pool resources. The analytical approach in most economic analyses is 
that of methodological individualism, where hypotheses are based on the representative, 
rational and self-interested individual who maximizes utility and on the basis of observed 
attributes of several successful case studies, the theory focuses on creating incentives for 
collective action through institutional design. This paper argues that an incentive based 
approach following the rational-choice model of human behavior is not sufficient to 
explain the success of voluntary groups in overcoming the free rider problem and seeks 
explanations from social and behavioral theories for a better understanding of the 
outcome of collective action efforts. Based on illustrations from experiences in the Joint 
Forest Management program in India, the paper suggests a direction for survey research 
to that would enable us to identify some relevant behavioral regularities, such as 
endowment effects, loss aversion and framing, among the group of resource users that 
can be helpful in explaining the outcome of collective action efforts and can inform 
policy makers to design the policy in a way that is more likely to reinforce desired 
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Collective action in the management of common-pool natural resources is an issue that 
has been studied extensively by social scientists in the past two decades. A common-pool 
resource is defined as “a natural or manmade resource system that is sufficiently large as 
to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining 
benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 1990: pp30). Under a market structure, the high exclusion 
cost characteristic of common-pool resources enables free riders who would like to 
benefit from the conservation efforts undertaken by other users without cutting down 
their own levels of consumption. Centralized administrative management of common-
pool natural resources through quantitative restrictions on the level of extraction was seen 
as the solution to this market failure but high information, monitoring and enforcement 
costs reduce the effectiveness of an administrative structure. The ineffectiveness of 
market and administrative structures in managing large natural resources has led to an 
interest in the role of local communities in the management of natural resources. 
Devolution of rights and responsibilities to local user groups is now being advocated in 
many countries but the success of participatory management depends on the ability of the 
group to work collectively and overcome the free rider problem.  
 
The Joint Forest Management (JFM) program in India is an endeavor to conserve the 
forest resources through joint efforts of local fringe villages and the Forest Department. 
Forests in India are state owned, common pool natural resources. Until the end of the 
19th century, at least 80 percent of India’s natural resources were held under common   2
property regimes. The amount of forest area under state control increased progressively 
since the British colonial period. The severe and rapid degradation of forests in the first 
three decades after independence caused great concern and once again, since the 1980s, 
there has been a slow shift towards the concept of community management and joint 
forest management (JFM) programs, though in the current arrangement the state retains 
ownership of those lands. Currently it is estimated that 17.33 million ha of forestland is 
being managed through JFM efforts. There are around 84,672 JFM communities spread 
over 27 states. The performance of the JFM program, however, varies significantly across 
states and also between different villages in a state and this has motivated a lot of 
research to analyze the causes for difference in outcome.  
 
The problem of collective action is to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma type situation 
where individual action choices, in the aggregate, lead to an outcome that is not preferred 
by anyone in the group. Empirical evidence from a number of successful efforts of 
collective natural resource management has led to research on developing conditions that 
enable self-organized groups of resource users to overcome the problem of free riding 
and collectively manage common pool resources. The analytical approach followed by 
most works on collective action is that of methodological individualism. Hypotheses are 
based on the rational-choice model under which the representative self-interested 
individual, after a rational benefit-cost calculation, acts in a way that maximizes utility. 
Works by Ostrom (1990), Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996) are among the 
most significant contributions towards developing institutional conditions for successful 
collective action. These institutional “design principles” have served as guidelines in   3
many initiatives, like the JFM program in India, to promote community based resource 
management programs in developing countries. However, the varying rates of success in 
many such initiatives suggests that these principles cannot be taken as a blueprint for 
successful collective action and that there may be other factors that influence people’s 
choices, which need to be considered in analyzing the success or failure of collective 
action in managing common-pool resources.  
 
This paper argues that an incentive based approach following the rational-choice model 
of human behavior is not sufficient to explain the success of voluntary groups in 
overcoming the free rider problem and seeks explanations from social and behavioral 
theories for a better understanding of the outcome of collective action efforts. Works in 
cognitive and social psychology provide evidence that human beings do not always 
satisfy the homo economicus assumptions on which neoclassical economics rests and 
therefore behavior can be guided by forces other than self-interest, such as notions of 
fairness, commitment or altruism. This does not imply that people are not motivated by 
self-interest. It only emphasizes that everyone at all times does not act out of purely 
selfish motives.  
 
Further, behavior may not always be the outcome of a calculated choice. Emotions play 
an important role in behavior. On one hand, emotions may influence people’s preferences 
and their evaluation of costs and benefits but they can also be a cause for people to stop 
their cost-benefit calculation and affect their choice of action (Elster, 1998). Margolis 
(1987) suggests that behavior is an outcome of pattern recognition. A cue from the   4
environment gets associated with a pattern that fits the cue and in turn leads to an action 
that is associated with the pattern. Learning is seen as a process of identifying new 
patterns and making new connections. Stimulus-response behaviorism is a perspective in 
social psychological research that suggests that people respond to a stimulus, and operant 
conditioning works on the behavioral response and either reinforces it or reduces the 
behavior. Learning occurs through reinforcement and replication of the behavior 
(Skinner, 1971). The process of learning may happen at a subconscious level and it may 
not be possible to identify the process that generates a certain response to a stimulus from 
the environment. However, insights from behavioral concepts can be helpful in 
understanding the beliefs and preferences of the group of resource users that influence 
their response to a policy stimulus.  
 
This paper aims at suggesting a direction for survey research to elicit information on the 
behavioral characteristics of a group of resource users that would enable us to identify 
some of the factors other than rational benefit-cost calculus that could influence behavior. 
This information could be useful in furthering the analysis of collective action. It could 
also be helpful in informing policy makers about possible cues that might stimulate 
desired behavior in particular contexts. Further, it could be helpful for a preliminary 
analysis before similar policies that involve grassroots level work are introduced.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a summary of the evolution, main features and performance of the 
Joint Forest Management program in India. Chapter 3 discusses the literature on the 
analysis of conditions that enable successful collective action and the arguments that   5
underlie the rationale for collective action in the common-pool resource management. 
Chapter 4 then presents some alternative explanations for collective action from social 
and psychological theories and focuses on the role of learning in understanding behavior. 
An alternative approach to survey research that elicits information about people’s 
attitudes and behavioral patterns is suggested. Chapter 5 presents some key conclusions 
and suggestions for further research.   6
CHAPTER 2 
THE JOINT-FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN INDIA: EVOLUTION, 
FEATURES AND PERFORMANCE 
India is a large country having a total forest cover of 67.55 million ha, which constitutes 
20% of its geographical area. This is composed of 41.68 million ha (12.68%) of dense 
forest and 25.87 million ha (7.8%) of open forest. There are 4.73 million ha of scrub 
forest (FSI, 2003; Ravindranath and Sudha, 2004). Forests are common pool natural 
resources that have high exclusion costs to a certain degree. Until the end of the 19th 
century, at least 80 percent of India’s natural resources were held under common property 
regimes. The amount of forest area under state control increased progressively since the 
British colonial period. The first Forest Policy of India, in 1952 when the country’s main 
priority was industrialization, focused on revenue generation as the primary objective and 
encouraged the plantation of high-value commercial species such as teak and eucalyptus, 
which have relatively low exclusion costs. The emphasis on income generation highlights 
path dependence and the influence of colonial management regime on the forest policies 
in the first three decades after independence in 1947. Towards the 1980s social 
movements sprung up in many parts of the country to protest against the indiscriminate 
destruction of forests due to the thrust on revenue generation, which severely affected the 
livelihood of local communities in the forest fringe villages that depended on the forest to 
meet their demand for fuel wood and other non-timber forest products. The rapid 
destruction of forests to meet commercial demand from the timber industry and the 
conflicting interest between local and commercial users of the resource caused great 
concern about the management of the resource base. The National Forest Policy in 1988   7
marked a significant shift in focus from commercial forestry and centralized management 
regime to a greater emphasis on community and local participation in the management of 
forests through the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programs, though in the current 
arrangement the state retains ownership of those lands. The JFM program is aimed at a 
co-management scheme where fringe forest user groups and the Forest department jointly 
define roles and responsibilities with regard to forest protection and development and 
share the costs and benefits of forest conservation. The driving force for the program has 
been the linking of socio-economic incentives for forest fringe communities and the 
development and conservation of the forest. The origin of the JFM concept can be traced 
to the success of participatory management efforts like the Arabari experiment in West 
Bengal in the 1970s. Currently it is estimated that 17.33 million ha of forestland is being 
managed through JFM efforts. There are around 84,672 JFM communities spread over 27 
states. 
 
2.1  ORIGIN OF THE JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
The JFM program was an outcome of several struggles and social movements that were 
initiated at the grassroots by local users of the forest who depended on the forest products 
for their livelihoods. Among the most notable movements are the Chipko movement in 
Uttar Pradesh in the 1970s and the Arabari program in West Bengal in the 1980s.  
 
2.1.1  The Chipko Movement 
The Chipko movement is one of the most successful movements, which originated with 
localized efforts in Uttar Pradesh in the early 1970s to prevent the destruction of Indian   8
forests by unsustainable logging.  The movement developed into a regional movement 
with thousands of supporters, particularly women, and succeeded in achieving bans on 
clear felling and influenced the forest policy in its move towards participatory 
management. The movement got its name “Chipko”, which in Hindi literally means “to 
stick”, from the medium of protest that was adopted by the villagers. Following the 
Gandhian path of non-violence, the women in the Himalayan villages in Uttarkhand 
physically hugged the trees to save them from being cut. This peaceful struggle achieved 
great success and the movement spread throughout the country. There were poems 
written on this form of protest and the Chipko movement became a part of the culture and 
tradition of peaceful retaliation in the villages (Shiva, 1991: Chapter 4).  
 
2.1.2  The Arabari Experiment 
The Arabari experiment in the early 1980s in West Bengal is seen as a trendsetter and a 
forerunner of the formal JFM program. The ‘Arabari Experiment’ was initiated by Dr. 
Ajit Banerjee who was then the District Forest Officer (DFO) in the Arabari range in the 
district of Midnapur. He had started a silviculture project that was severely hindered by 
the villagers who were cutting down the young trees to meet their fuel wood needs. The 
exclusion costs were high since there were only a few forest guards who were in charge 
of monitoring large areas of forests. He realized that he needed the cooperation of the 
villagers in his project and so, he entered into an informal agreement with the villagers to 
give them user rights to NTFPs and a small share in the profits from sale of timber and 
also employment opportunity in exchange for the protection of the silviculture plots 
(Joshi, 1999). Similar informal arrangements emerged in other areas as well. The success   9
of such initiatives led to the change in formal institutions from administrative to JFM 
regime. The Communist party, which came to power in 1972 with a pro-workers 
ideology, acted as a catalyst in the process. 
 
2.2  FEATURES OF THE JFM PROGRAM 
The JFM program is a co-management scheme where fringe forest user groups and the 
Forest department jointly define roles and responsibilities towards forest protection and 
development and share the costs and benefits of forest conservation. The implementation 
of the program is flexible and the rules and provision vary across states and even between 
villages in the same state. However, we can identify some broad characteristics of the 
program that apply in general to all JFM communities.  
 
2.2.1  Forest Protection Committees 
Local participation in the management of forests takes place through the formation of 
Forest Protection Committees (FPC) composed of the members of the villages in the 
forest region who are responsible for the protection of forestland. Membership 
conditions, rules and norms vary across states but in general at least one representative of 
every household in the village is registered as a member of the FPC. The boundaries of 
the forest area under each FPC are determined by the Forest Department. There is an 
Executive Committee that has representatives from the Forest Department as well as the 
local village members. The Forest Department however has the power to disband a badly 
functioning committee, cancel membership, and nominate NGOs for membership,   10
thereby making the power relationship between the Forest Department and the FPCs 
unequal. 
 
2.2.2  Benefit and cost sharing arrangements 
The FPC members are given rights to non timber forest products (NTFP) including 
firewood, grass, fruits, flowers, leaves and seeds without having to pay any royalty. The 
use of NTFP is a high exclusion cost good because it would be difficult to monitor and 
enforce a restriction. They are also given a share in the proceeds from timber after the 
final harvest. The JFM policy tries to address the interdependencies due to the HEC 
nature of the resource system through something like a tie-in sales by making the usufruct 
rights and share in profits from sale of timber contingent upon the FPC’s meeting a 
certain goal specified in terms of the level of increased forest cover and protection of the 
forest from illegal logging. The extent of share in the net proceeds from timber harvest 
varies across states and ranges from 25% to 100%. The FPCs and the Forest Department 
also share the costs of forest conservation and development activities. A portion of the 
share of village benefits from the sale of commercial crops is usually deposited in a 
Village Development Fund. The FD also makes a contribution to the fund from its share 
of proceeds from the sale of harvested timber. JFM also relies heavily on external 
funding from international agencies like the World Bank.  
 
2.2.3  Monitoring and Conflict Resolution 
The FPCs organize themselves in designing the everyday rules regarding the distribution 
of work and how the forest rehabilitation objective is to be achieved without any external   11
pressure. Once the desired objective is agreed upon between the Forest Department and 
the FPC, the manner in which the goal is met is left to the FPC. The Executive 
Committee, which has representatives from the forest department and the village 
panchayats, provide for conflict resolution rules. The penalties for defection and violation 
of rules are community sanctions and vary from village to village. Social sanctions are 
common and are effective in reducing the rate of defection since the FPCs are small and 
most people living in the village know one another well (Hill, 2000).  
 
2.2.4  Role of Women 
In most villages in India the occupational structure is such that the men engage in 
agriculture and the work of collecting fuel wood and other forest related products is 
undertaken by the women in the village. It has been estimated that women spend three 
times as much time in the collection of NTFP than men and the processing of these forest 
products is undertaken entirely by women (Hill, 2000). The greater dependence of 
women on forest resources has led to efforts to increase the involvement of women in the 
forest management activities. The Forest Protection Committees in many states have 
mandated the participation of women in the Executive Committees. Further, some FPCs, 
with the help of NGOs, are trying to start a women’s cell/group to focus on the activities 
undertaken by women and to provide a platform for women to express their opinions and 
suggestions about the availability and use of forest produce and create employment 
opportunities. Field studies suggest that the participation of women in the decision 
making process of JFM activities in many FPCs is still minimal and inadequate. 
   12
2.3 PERFORMANCE 
The JFM program has received a lot of support from the central and state governments as 
well as external donor agencies like the World Bank. The performance of the program 
has, however, varied significantly across states and even across villages within the same 
state and it would be difficult to assess whether the program has been an overall success 
or failure. A study by Ravindranath et all (2004) based on the perspective of the JFMC 
presidents and management committee members conducted in 6 states – Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Tripura and West Bengal - indicates that “29% of the 
JFMCs responded that the overall performance was good, 49% rated it as moderate, 
while the remaining 22% could not definitely say, or did not, perceive any change 
compared to the pre-JFM times” (Sudha and Ravindranath, 2004: pp 322). Studies have 
shown that the program has been very successful in the state of West Bengal, where it 
was first introduced. The yield of non-timber forest produce (NTFP) increased and the 
conflicts between forest department officials and villagers and the cases of offence or 
illegal logging also reduced. As reported by Aruradha Joshi (1999), satellite surveys 
show that the forest cover in west Bengal increased by 4.5% between 1988 and 1991. 
Studies have also reported that the program has been successful in states like Andhra 
Praesh, Karnataka and Gujarat (Ravindranath et al, 2004). The positive outcome of the 
JFM efforts include increased forest cover, increased trust between local users and the 
forest department, increase in income of local villagers from the share in the proceeds 
from the commercial sale of timber, increased participation and empowerment of women 
and increased employment. However, these positive impacts have not reached several 
villages in which the JFM program has been introduced. Among the key challenges that   13
are faced by many villages are the decline in the performance of JFM efforts after 
external funding is withdrawn, inadequate participation by the local community and a 
top-down approach with most of the decision making being undertaken by the FD, a lack 
of awareness about the program and inadequate legal backing for the FPCs (Ravindranath 
et al, 2004 pp 324-329).   14
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL COLLECTIVE ACTION IN NATURAL 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
A large part of the literature on common-pool resource management focuses on 
developing conditions that enable self-organized groups of resource users to collectively 
manage common pool resources. The ineffectiveness of market and administrative 
structures in managing large natural resources has led to an interest in the role of local 
communities in the management of natural resources. Devolution or transfer of rights and 
responsibilities to local user groups is advocated for several reasons. Firstly, it is argued 
that local communities have an incentive to preserve the resource because they are 
critically dependent on the resource for livelihood. They therefore have an interest in the 
use and maintenance of the resource over a long period of time. Further, the limited 
effectiveness of the state in managing natural resources effectively at the local level, 
bounds on the financial capacity of developing countries to adequately monitor the use of 
large natural resources such as forests and the demand for democratization of the decision 
making process in the management of natural resources by increased participation of 
people most affected by the program and social empowerment of local user groups are 
other important factors that have led to the focus on community participation in resource 
management (Knox and Meinzen-Dick, 2001). These were the arguments that motivated 
participatory management programs like the JFM in India and many other countries.  
 
Works by Ostrom (1990), Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996) are among the 
most significant analyses that develop conditions for successful collective action based   15
on a large number of case studies. The analytical approach in most of the economics 
literature on collective action is that of methodological individualism. Hypotheses are 
based on the representative, rational and self-interested individual who maximizes utility 
and on the basis of observed attributes of several successful case studies, the theory 
focuses on creating incentives for collective action through institutional design. 
Institutions are the structure of property rights and rules that govern human interaction 
and the centrality of property relations arises not because property relations connect 
people to land and other resources, but rather because such relations connect people to 
each other with respect to the land and related natural resources (Bromley, 2001; Schmid, 
2004). The factors that condition the choice of the institutional structure and the outcome 
of collective action have broadly been classified into three categories – physical and 
technical characteristics of the resource, characteristics of the group users and attributes 
of the institutions that govern the interaction between the different users of the resource 
(Tang 1992; Uphoff 1986). The inherent characteristics of a good create 
interdependencies and associated with these interdependencies we can think of alternative 
institutional structures and corresponding hypotheses of substantive performance in terms 
of production and who gains and who loses (Schmid, 2004).  
 
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS  OF THE RESOURCE 
The two most important characteristics of common-pool resources that have been 
emphasized in the literature are the high exclusion cost nature of the resource system and 
subtractability of the resource units. However, there are other interdependencies in the   16
case of forests that would be useful to consider in the analysis of the performance of 
collective management institutions.  
 
3.1.1  The Resource System as a High Exclusion Cost Good 
An inherent feature of the forest resource system makes it difficult to exclude people who 
live in the fringe villages from the benefits of the resource base. The resource system is 
both a high exclusion cost good and a non-rival good to a certain extent because the 
benefits, such as carbon sequestration, reduction of soil erosion and siltation etc., from 
increased forest cover to one user do not diminish the availability of the benefits to 
another user. The HEC nature of the resource creates incentives for free riders who would 
like to benefit from the conservation measures undertaken by other uses without cutting 
down one their own consumption and “unwitting riders”, who do not cooperate because 
they feel their action will not make a difference (Schmid, 2004 pp: 95). This can be seen 
as a multi-person prisoners’ dilemma where everyone would be better off if the resource 
system is maintained but the dominant strategy for every player is to default or not 
cooperate since the individual’s payoff is greater regardless of the choices of other 
players. The effect of an individual’s effort is insignificant unless a certain critical 
threshold of cooperators is reached (Schelling, 1978).  
 
3.1.2  Resource Units as Incompatible Use Goods (IUG) 
Ostrom (1990) emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the “resource 
system” and the individual “resource units”, which in the case of forests includes timber 
and other non-timber forest produce (NTFP) like twigs, leaves, fodder, firewood etc.   17
While the resource system is a HEC good, the resource units or the forest products are 
incompatible use goods (IUG) because the units extracted by one person are not available 
for the others. Subtractability of the resource has two effects – Firstly, a user of the CPR 
subtracts a flow of benefits available to others. Secondly, cumulative use of the resource 
by many users will eventually subtract from the total yield. (Shekhar, 1998).  
 
3.1.3  Efficiency in preserving the resource base as a CPR rather than individual 
portions  
Another feature of common pool resources is that the benefits from preserving the 
resource pool are greater than the benefits from improvements on a part of the resource. 
As in the case of pastures where it is more efficient to allow cows to graze together 
across the entire pasture rather than to keep each owner’s cows within a fenced portion of 
the pasture (Schmid, 2004 pp: 99), it would also be beneficial to users of a forest resource 
to use and maintain a larger area of the forest where by they can use different types of 
forest products and species of trees rather than allocate specific plots to individuals. 
Privatization of individual forest plots was seen as a solution to the problem of 
degradation of the CPR. However, when there are multiple users of the resource, 
especially for the NTFPs, it would be efficient for the user groups to preserve a larger 
forest base with a variety of tree species that could provide diverse products, such as 
leaves, medicinal herbs, twigs, bamboo etc., rather than allot small portions of the forest 
area to individual users.  
 
   18
3.1.4  Quality of the Resource 
The quality of the resource could also affect the potential for collective action in the 
management of the resource. Though the resource system is a non-rival good as discussed 
above, in the case of common-pool resources like forests that have multiple uses there 
may still be conflicting interests between users of the resource regarding the quality or 
composition of the resource system or the type of trees to be grown. In order to increase 
the commercial value, the timber industry would prefer to grow tall sal trees whereas the 
villagers who rely on the forests for their daily livelihoods would prefer to grow shorter 
trees with a larger spread that provide easy access to leaves and other NTFPs. Similarly, 
the paper and pulp industry prefer the plantation of eucalyptus trees but it draws a lot of 
moisture and makes the soil dry, thereby hindering the cultivation of other trees and also 
reducing the availability of water for irrigation. The quality/composition of the resource 
system is a preemptive choice that decides the nature of the non-rival good and therefore 
reflects whose interests count.  
 
3.2  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE USERS 
The characteristics of the group of users that influence the outcome of collective action 
include the users’ demand for, dependence on and knowledge of the resource, the size of 
the group, homogeneity of the group, level of trust and social capital, past experience and 
leadership.  
3.2.1  Dependence on the resource 
It has been noted that the extent to which local users depend on the resource for their 
livelihoods also has serious impact on the level of cooperation that can be expected in the   19
management of the resource since local users who are critically dependent on the 
resource have an economic incentive to protect the resource (Uphoff, Wickramasinghe 
and Wijayaratna 1990; Wade 1988; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995). In many 
villages in India it has been observed that the forests have been degraded to such an 
extent that many villagers are now moving to the nearby cities for employment 
opportunities. The reduction in the level of dependence on the resource for their daily 
sustenance along with the fact that they have to travel several hours each day to the 
workplace in the city leaves many of the villagers with neither the incentive nor the time 
to participate in the JFM activities. While the economic incentive is an important part of 
the explanation, it may not be sufficient because it suggests that the availability of better 
opportunities elsewhere would reduce interest in conserving the resource. It could 
however be argued that close association with the resource in everyday activities can 
create a sense of belonging and responsibility towards the resource, which may contribute 
to the success of collective management efforts.  
 
3.2.2 Group  Size 
The group size has also been identified as an important factor that would affect the 
outcome of collective action. A general hypothesis is that with an increasing number of 
participants, the possibility of voluntary organization will decrease (Olson, 1965; Wade, 
1998; Bardhan 1993). This hypothesis is based on the argument that the smaller the 
group, each member of the group would get a substantial share in the benefits from the 
resource, which may exceed their marginal costs of contribution and therefore, the 
possibility of free riding is reduced. While these arguments are valid, it remains an   20
empirical question to determine how small the group should be in order to ensure 
cooperation (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985). Further, empirical case studies show evidence 
of successful collective action in many large groups (Ostrom, 1990).  
 
3.2.3 Heterogeneity 
Baland and Platteau (2001) point out that the effects of heterogeneity on collective action 
are ambiguous because inequality is not unilateral. Different dimensions of inequality 
may have opposing effects on collective action and therefore when such dimensions are 
combined, the effect on collective action cannot be determined clearly. The effect of 
inequality also depends on the type of action that is being considered. The outcome may 
be quite different when the action involves a group of members lobbying for or against 
certain regulations as opposed to contributing towards the construction of collective 
infrastructure. Besides economic inequality, heterogeneity may also be in terms of the 
uses of the resource. In this case, the resource is an incompatible use good among the 
different users, which leads to a different type of interdependency compared to high 
exclusion cost characteristic of the resource system. It has been pointed out by many 
authors that the role of heterogeneity is not captured when the policy alternatives are seen 
as being management by the ‘community’ versus command and control (Agarwal and 
Gibson, 1999). In the case of conflicting interests among resource users, whose interests 
count depend on the power structure and the bargaining capacities of the different parties.  
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3.2.4 Trust 
The role of social capital and trust, both between the local user group and the state and 
among the members of the group, has been emphasized in the literature. Schmid (2002) 
defines trust as the willingness to risk potential gains to opportunistic behavior and 
argues that caring and sympathy for others motivate trust. But the next question is - how 
do people develop feelings of care and sympathy for others? Trust and caring would be 
influenced by a reciprocity motive and person’s belief about others might be affected by 
their recent experiences. Economic analysis of trust has been modeled as a dynamic game 
and it is argued that repeated interaction creates an incentive to signal trustworthiness 
(Bowles, 2004 pp: 241-247). One explanation may be found in the level of 
communication and mutual interdependence among the members of the group. If the trust 
is reciprocated then the feeling gets reinforced and increases the level of trust and we 
could argue that the reinforcement gets stronger with the number of interactions. A 
similar argument can be developed for the case when trust is not reciprocated and may 
act as a negative reinforcement and reduce the level of cooperative behavior.  
 
3.2.5 Bounded  Rationality 
The concept of bounded rationality, introduced by Herbert Simon (1955), emphasizes the 
fact that the human brain has limited information processing capacity and therefore, 
people cannot take into account every possible alternative while making their choices as 
assumed by the standard neoclassical theory. People necessarily simplify, form habits and 
resort to standard operating procedures in making their choices. There is not much 
disagreement about the concept of bounded rationality, and the economic argument is   22
that individuals maximize utility within the constraints of information availability and 
processing capacity. The classic tragedy of the commons has been modeled as a 
Prisoners’ dilemma game where each individual acting in her or his own individual 
interest collectively lead to an outcome that makes the group collectively worse off 
(Baland & Platteau, 1996 Chapter 5). The standard game theory argument to overcome 
this dilemma has been the case of an infinitely repeated game. It has also been argued 
that the uncertainty concerning the number of plays that players will face can motivate a 
cooperative outcome can be achieved. However, empirical evidence shows a number of 
situations where people have succeeded in overcoming the dilemma even in a one shot 
game and we could argue that this could be because they do not make strictly calculative 
decisions based on their payoffs.  
 
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL  ATTRIBUTES  FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
Institutional arrangements for the use and management of common pool resources have 
been classified under three categories - Operational rules, collective choice rules and 
constitutional rules (Ostrom, 1990, Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995). Operational 
rules directly affect the use of the resource and include boundary and access rules, 
allocation rules, penalty rules, input rules and conflict resolution rules. Various authors 
have stressed the importance of clearly defined operational rules, which are simple and 
flexible in order to achieve collective action. (Baland & Pleatteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990) 
Collective choice rules give guidelines for formulating, changing and enforcing 
operational rules. These rules for making rules define who is eligible and how the future   23
operational rules will be made (Ostrom 1990: 141-142). Constitutional rules provide the 
broader framework within which collective and operational rules work. It includes 
property rights protected by public regulation, level of delegation of decision making, 
environmental and natural resource regulation, rights of reorganization and the market 
arrangements. Agarwal (2001) synthesizes some of the main conditions for successful 
collective action in managing common-pool resources identified by the major works of 
Ostrom (1990), Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996). Table 1 shows the list of 
conditions for successful collective action identified on the basis of a large number of 
case studies.  Agarwal (2001) starts by pointing out that the list of variables that have 
been identified in the literature is long and difficult to apply to all cases. However, he 
adds more conditions to this list of variables that affect the success of collective action 
and suggests that there is a need to focus on causal relations between different factors and 
the institutions that connect them.  
A list of the institutional characteristics of successful efforts is a seen as the first step 
towards the development of a theory of collective action. However, it is quite difficult to 
find cases where all the conditions are applicable. While the importance of these 
conditions for successful collective action listed by various researches after empirical 
observation of a large number of case studies cannot be undermined, it cannot be ignored 
that there is a possibility of a selection bias in the case studies undertaken. Cases of 
success with strong local organizations are far more likely to be written about than the 
failure stories and therefore the list approach falls short of giving a complete picture. 
Arguments towards of a theory of collective action are developed on the basis of the 
observed institutional attributes of successful cases using the model of rational choice   24
where individuals choose from the set of possible alternatives, the action that will 
maximize their net benefits.  
Table 1: Synthesis of facilitating features identified by Wade, Ostrom, Baland and 
Platteau 
1.  Resource system characteristics 
(i)  Small Size (RW) 
(ii)  Well defined boundaries (RW, EO) 
 
2.  Group characteristics 
(i)    Small size (RW, B&P) 
(ii)  Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO) 
(iii)  Shared norms (B&P) 
(iv)  Past successful experiences – social capital (RW, B&P) 
(v)  Appropriate leadership – young, familiar with changing external environments, 
connected to local tradition elite (B&P) 
(vi)  Interdependence among group members (RW, B&P) 
(vii)  Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identity and interests (B&P) 
 
1. & 2.  Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics 
(i)  Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P) 
(ii)  High levels of dependence by group members on the resource system (RW) 
(iii)  Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources (B&P) 
 
3.  Institutional arrangements 
(i)  Rules are easy and simple to understand (B&P) 
(ii)  Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, B&P) 
(iii)  Ease in enforcement of rules (RW, EO, B&P) 
(iv)  Graduated sanctions (RW, EO) 
(v)  Availability of low cost adjudication (EO) 
(vi)  Accountability of monitors and other officials to users (EO, B&P) 
 
1. & 3.  Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements 
(i)  Match restrictions on harvest to regeneration of resources (RW, EO) 
 
4.  External environment 
(i)  Technology: Low cost exclusion technology (RW) 
(ii) State: 
(a)  Central governments should not undermine local authority (RW, EO) 
(b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P) 
(c)  Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation 
activities (B&P) 
(d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO) 
 
Source: Agarwal, 2001   25
The conditions for successful collective action suggest that the establishment of the right 
institutions can create incentives that would make cooperation the rational choice. It has 
however been observed that, while these conditions are common to many successful 
collective action efforts, attempts to implant the institutional “design principles” on 
communities have failed to achieve the desired results. This implies that there may be 
other factors that influence the behavior of people. The next question that policy makers 
are faced with is how communities that do not already have the institutional attributes for 
successful collective action can be motivated to change in a way that may increase the 
likelihood of collective action. Insights from social and behavioral theories may be useful 
in strengthening the analysis. Alternative explanations that are not based on the rational-
choice model may be useful in understanding the outcome of collective action.  
 
The Joint Forest Management program was introduced, following the success of 
participatory management efforts in some parts of India, with a view of designing 
institutions that would provide local villages an incentive to protect the forests.  The 
significant differences in outcome across states and even between villages in the same 
state called for an investigation into the structure of the program. Most of the analyses on 
the JFM program have focused on conflicting interests of the Forest Department and the 
local users, the lack of proper incentives for cooperation and the imbalanced power 
relations.  Explanations from social and psychological theories may enrich the arguments 
and could lead to policy suggestions to improve performance.   26
CHAPTER 4 
EXPLANATIONS FROM SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL THEORIES AND THE 
ROLE OF LEARNING IN THE ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
4.1   SOCIAL THEORY 
Collective action is an area of research in several disciplines including economics, 
sociology, anthropology and geography. Sociologists have devoted a lot of energy in 
trying to understand social factors that motivate collective behavior. Most of the 
sociological work on collective behavior has focused on social movements, revolutions, 
and other forms of political violence, but some of the explanations for the motivation of 
collective action could be applicable to the case of managing common-pool resources.  
 
4.1.1  Relative Deprivation Theory 
One explanation for the motivation for collective action is based on the theory of ‘relative 
deprivation’. Relative deprivation is defined as, “a perceived discrepancy between men’s 
value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970: 13) and it is argued that 
social conditions that increase expectations without increasing capabilities to realize them 
create discontent, which is the basic motivation for participants in collective violence 
(Marx and Wood, 1975). In the case of collective action in the management of common-
pool resources, we could enquire whether this explanation for collective violence would 
also be applicable in the case where a group of resource users, who may feel deprived of 
opportunities to use the resource over a long term due to their lack of economic power, 
might act collectively towards achieving a change in the structure of property rights. The 
increase in expectation and therefore discontent may be due to the knowledge about the   27
rights of similar groups in other regions. Discontent may also arise due to expectations of 
local people regarding the responsibilities of the government towards the protection of 
the forest and their needs. The important factor is the general belief of the members of the 
group about their relative position in comparison to other groups of users of the resource. 
 
In the case of forests in India we could inquire whether the members of local forest fringe 
villages feel that the Forest Department is meeting their expectations about its 
responsibility towards forest conservation measures and towards ensuring that the 
subsistence needs of the local users for fuel wood and other NTFPs are not ignored. A 
discontent with the functioning of the forest department could be a factor that affects the 
actions of the local communities in different ways. Firstly, it could be an explanation for 
the social forestry measures undertaken by village groups in the early 1980s and their 
efforts to lobby for increased participation of local user groups in the management of the 
forest resource, which itself is a high exclusion cost good. The Joint Forest Management 
program in the 1990s was an outcome of such struggles that emerged in the 1980 through 
out the country. Alternatively, in some villages where voluntary action did not emerge, 
discontent regarding the forest department’s concern about the needs of the villagers 
could be a cause for resentment and anger and could lead to the lack of cooperation of the 
village with the JFM efforts of the FD. Further, it may also lead to resignation and 
despair rather than collective action. To understand which alternative evolves it will be 
necessary to undertake a deeper study of the specific social and historical context. 
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4.1.2 Social  Identity 
Recent work by Simpson and Macy (2004) focuses on the role of social structures and 
social identity in collective action. Drawing from Tajfel’s distinction between personal 
and social identity, social identity is defined as “that part of an individuals self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981: pp225). 
Using an experimental game setting, they argue that social structure affects collective 
action in two ways. Firstly, the motivation for collective action depends on the social 
structure and the relative positions of different groups of actors or the different 
opportunity sets of actors that affect their relative bargaining power. This argument is 
consistent with the explanation for social movements based on ‘relative deprivation 
theory’. Secondly, they argue that the success of collective action, which rests on solving 
the free-rider problem, depends on the social identities that are also created by social 
relations. It is argued that social identity reduces the distinction between individual and 
group interest and therefore helps overcome the free rider problem in collective action. 
Through social identity, “the meaning of self-interest is transformed to the group level 
and group welfare becomes a part of the rational calculus by which an individual 
evaluates the costs and benefits of intended actions and potential outcomes” (Brewer and 
Silver, 2000: pp160). The role of trust and community bonding in the success of 
collective action has been acknowledged by most researchers but it would be worth 
investigating whether social identity makes people refine their cost-benefit calculus or if 
it invokes a sense of commitment and thereby leads to decision making that is not based 
on a calculation of costs and benefits. Social identity and can also explain why people   29
might be willing to incur costs to punish those who defect from social norms even though 
the effect of social sanctions is a high exclusion cost good.  
 
In the context of managing forest resources, we would want to enquire whether or not 
people in a particular Forest Protection Committee identify with one another as members 
of a group and then whether such a feeling of social bonding or identity contributes to the 
success or failure of collective efforts in managing the common-pool resource. To elicit 
information on social identity we could survey the members of a group and ask if a better 
opportunity available in the city or in another village (say, a village that has been 
successful in collective management of forest area) would motivate them to move from 
their village and whether they thought they would feel that they are a part of the new 
community.  Further, we could ask whom they would expect help from in the event of a 
crisis - crop failure or a calamity in the family - and what percent of the village 
population would they expect to give the same answer. Similar studies have been done to 
measure social capital and to understand the effect of poverty on the ability for groups to 
self-organize to solve common problems faced by a community (Krishna, 2004; Schmid 
et al, (unpublished)). We would also want to enquire whether they would help other 
members of the group, financially or physically, if they faced a crisis and whether 
actually they thought about why they were offering help at the time at which they choose 
to act.  
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4.1.3 Communicative  Action 
The fact that the success of collective action efforts varies between groups and places has 
stimulated an interest among geographers as well. It is now well understood that 
collective identity formation and place-specific social relations are crucial in the 
achievement of collective action. Drawing from Herbman’s work on “The theory of 
communicative action” (1984), Miller (1992) argues that an explanation for cooperative 
behavior can be in terms of communicative action. He notes that communicative action is 
distinguished from communication in general in that it “emphasizes the interaction in 
which two or more subjects seek to reach an understanding concerning their shared 
situation” (Miller, 1992: pp26). Communicative action is based on communicative 
rationality, which involves raising validity claims between two or more subjects, and a 
speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept his statement by providing convincing 
ground that would stand up to the hearer’s criticism of the validity claim. Herbman’s 
work emphasizes the central role of communicative action in the reproduction and 
transformation of cultural traditions, values, cultural identities and social values. This 
highlights the decentralized nature of analysis. What a reasonable argument is, which 
would enable an understanding between the subjects, depends on the cultural background 
that they share in common.  Once communication with the purpose of reaching an 
understanding between the subjects is differentiated from general communication, it 
becomes hard to measure. The frequency of social interaction in the form of informal 
meetings, dinners etc. is not sufficient though it does provide a starting point. 
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In the context of forest management in India, information about the communication 
networks in the village can be useful in understanding interdependencies among the users 
of the resource and can help in the decision of boundaries of the forest area that is 
managed by each group. Information about the level of attendance and participation in 
village board meetings can be used to infer the extent of awareness about the program. 
NGOs play an important role in information dissemination and records of communication 
between representatives of the NGO and local people would be useful to get a sense of 
the general understanding of the issues and the policies in the village. Further, it would be 
useful to study the correlation between the level of communication and social bonding in 
the community.  
 
4.2  THE ROLE OF BEHAVIORAL THEORIES  
Traditional economic analysis rests on the assumption of rational, self-interested 
individuals who have stable preferences and make calculated choices in a way that 
maximizes their utility. These assumptions have guided the analyses of most researchers 
who have sought to develop institutional conditions for successful collective action. 
However, if people’s actions may be motivated by forces other than self interest and 
preferences may change over time, there is a need to reconsider the incentive based 
argument.  
 
4.2.1 Heterogeneous  Preferences 
Works in cognitive and social psychology provide evidence that human beings do not 
always satisfy the homo economicus assumptions on which neoclassical economics rests.   32
Experimental and empirical studies suggest that human beings do not always display self-
interested preferences (Ledyard, 1995). There are many instances of what Samuel Bowles 
calls, “other regarding preferences”, where people make choices depending not only on 
the effect of their action on themselves but also the well being of others (Bowles, 2004: 
pp98). It is now well acknowledged that preferences may not always be based on purely 
selfish motives. Altruism, spite, social prestige, fairness etc. may also be driving forces 
for behavior. Economists have tried to incorporate these factors into the rational-choice 
model as additional arguments in the utility function of the individual, thereby retaining 
the utility maximization principle of rational choice. 
Fairness 
Behavior is often motivated by notions of fairness and reciprocity. The observation of a 
mean split of around 40 to 50% in the Ultimator and dictator games
1 provide classic 
examples of behavior that is guided by notions of fairness and not pure self interest. 
Equal split in shares has been observed in settings other than experimental ones. 
Sharecropping is a prevalent arrangement in many developing countries and the division 
of gains between landowners and tenants has tended towards the 50% split in many parts 
of the world (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993). Fairness and reciprocity can provide motivation 
for collective action efforts. This argument is consistent with the ‘relative deprivation’ 
explanation for collective action since the perceived expectations that lead to discontent 
could be based on a notion of fairness.  People’s beliefs about fairness can also help 
                                                 
1 In the ultimatum game two people are asked to split $10 between them. The first mover makes an offer 
that the other person can accept or reject. If the offer is accepted both players get the agreed share but if the 
offer is rejected neither player gets anything. Rational choice theory predicts an unequal split, say $9 and 
$1, favoring the first mover because the second player who is faced with the choice of accepting the $1 or 
getting nothing should rationally accept the offer.   33
overcome the second order problem of monitoring behavior within the group, and people 
may be willing to incur costs in order to punish those who violate norms. 
 
In analyzing the performance of the JFM program, information about whether or not the 
members of the FPC felt that the JFM program was giving them a fair deal would be 
helpful in order to understand the influence of notions of fairness on the level of 
cooperation among members of a village. It has also been noted that social sanctions are 
commonly practiced in many villages in India are found to be quite effective in reducing 
the level of illegal logging of forests (Hill, 2000).  
 
4.2.2  The Role of Emotions  
Emotions play an important role in decision-making. Anger can motivate people to incur 
costs to protest or retaliate against unjust treatment. Guilt and shame can act as deterrents 
to violations of social norms and make social sanctions effective. Anger or spite against a 
disloyal neighbor may lead to non-cooperative behavior by an individual even if such 
behavior is not in one’s own self-interest. Emotions could therefore influence people’s 
preferences and behavior. Emotions may also be a cause for people to stop considering 
the costs and benefits of their action. Elster (1998) refers to the “dual nature of emotions” 
where, on one hand, emotions can be a reason for behavior by influencing the arguments 
that enter an individual’s utility function and the evaluation of the outcome, but on the 
other hand, emotions may make people stop their benefit-cost calculation when making 
their action choice. Anger, guilt, shame or happiness could be reasons for people to stop 
the benefit-cost calculus and jump directly to an action. In trying to explain the outcome   34
of JFM efforts we would want to enquire if members of a village that has failed to 
achieve the desired performance feel enraged by a feeling of the Forest Department’s 
apathy towards their concerns, which could be an explanation for the failure of 
cooperation with the forest officials towards forest management. We would also want to 
know whether their retaliation to government policy was the outcome of a deliberated 
choice. Positive emotions like a sense of recognition, satisfaction or pride in contributing 
towards a common good can also be a reason for the success of collective action.  
 
Observations from Neuroeconomics 
The new field of neuroeconomics tries to connect economic decision making to the 
biological substrate of the brain. A study by Sanfey et al (2003) on “The neural basis of 
Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game” used functional neuro-imaging techniques to 
investigate the relative contributions of cognitive and emotional processes to human 
decision-making. They found that unfair offers stimulate activity in the parts of the brain 
that are related to both emotion (anterior insula) and cognition (dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex) but higher activity in the anterior insula for rejecting unfair offers suggests that 
emotions play an important role in decision making. Recent work by Dominique J.-F. de 
Quervain et al (2004) also confirms that there is a ‘neural basis for altruistic punishment’. 
A study by scientists at the Emory University in Atlanta, on the neural activity in young 
women when playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma game suggests that choosing cooperation 
over defection increased their satisfaction or happiness. The study used magnetic 
resonance imaging to take portraits of the brain. Contrary to the expectation that the 
largest response would occur in cases where the cooperator might feel that she was being   35
treated unjustly by the other person, the study found that the brightest signals arose in 
cooperative alliances and in those neighborhoods of the brain already known to respond 
to desserts, pictures of pretty faces, money, cocaine and many other delights. (Relling et 
al, 2002) 
 
These arguments do not imply that people are not motivated by self-interest. If that were 
the case and people always preferred to cooperate, the problem of collective action would 
not have arisen. It is only to emphasize that everyone at all times does not act out of 
purely selfish motives. People are heterogeneous and have different preferences and the 
problem in making collective action towards a common goal work, as Bowles says, “…is 
not to find a way to induce a homogenous population of self regarding individuals to 
implement a socially desirable outcome. Rather it is to devise rules such that in cases in 
which cooperation is socially desirable, individuals with other regarding preferences will 
have opportunities to express their pro-sociality in ways that induce all or most to 
cooperate” (Bowles, 2004: pp499). 
 
4.2.3 Behavioral  Regularities 
Studies by experimental psychologists have revealed certain behavioral regularities that 
may be influential in economic decision making by individuals. These observed 
regularities indicate that, given the limited information processing capacity of the human 
brain, there are some habits and patterns of thought that play an important role in 
people’s action choices. In the context of collective action and the cooperation of villages   36
with the JFM program we could explore some of the behavioral heuristics that may offer 
an explanation for the success or failure of the program in different areas.  
 
4.2.3.1 Availability Heuristic 
In making judgments, people tend to rely on information that they can recall most easily 
rather than consider all the information that could be available. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) call this the “availability heuristic” and through an experimental study show that 
this is a heuristic that is commonly used in judging frequency or likelihood of events. 
People’s expectations and therefore actions would be influenced by their most recent 
experiences and experiences that have had a deep impact on them, which would therefore 
be easily recalled when faced with similar situations. In the context of collective action, 
we can argue that the basis for peoples’ beliefs about the level of cooperation they would 
expect from the other members of the group may depend on their recent experiences with 
efforts to work together. The success of collective action is therefore “path dependent”. 
This is related to the availability heuristic though it may not be an exact application of the 
concept. It may be expected that in a village where people have acted collectively in 
tackling other issues in the recent past are more likely to succeed in collectively 
managing the forest. Furthermore, in the case of the JFM program, the level of 
cooperation from a village may also depend on the experience that the people in the given 
village have had with the forest department officers in the past. Experiences that have had 
a bitter impact and left an impression of distrust about the motives of the forest 
department may influence the action the people even if the suggested policy may in fact 
be beneficial to them. It has been noted by many authors that the success of collective   37
action depends on past experiences and the level of social capital that is built over the 
years. However, past experiences that have a deep impact may not only influence 
people’s expectations in the future but could also be a reason for people to stop 
calculating possible future outcomes and jump to conclusions about the outcome of a 
joint management effort. In analyzing the outcome of JFM efforts information could be 
gathered about past collective action experiences in the village, which may not 
necessarily be related to resource conservation efforts. Information about the villagers’ 
experiences of interaction with Forest Department officers in the past and their beliefs 
about the FD representative’s concern for the needs of local villagers can be helpful in 
analyzing the effect of past experience on the level of cooperation.  
 
4.2.3.2 Endowment Effect 
Experimental psychologists have observed that people demand more to give up an object 
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it (Thaler, 1980). Following the seminal 
work of Coase, economists have suggested that if transaction costs are sufficiently low 
private bargaining will lead to the efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial 
assignment of property rights (Coase, 1960). It has been argued that even in a 
hypothetical, zero-transaction cost world, assignment of property rights matter because of 
the implications for income distribution. Further, the assignment of property rights also 
explains the observed divergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
compensation measures of valuing natural resources since the WTP measure is limited by 
the income or the ability to pay of the individual whereas the WTAC measure is not 
(Schmid, 1987 pp: 219-223).  An endowment effect on an individual’s valuation also   38
offer an explanation for this observation and suggests that property rights matter even in a 
zero transactions costs world. Evidence from experimental studies suggests that human 
beings assess changes based on some reference point rather than an absolute magnitude 
and are more sensitive to marginal changes closer to their current state (Rabin, 1998). A 
simple example is that the same temperature feels colder in the fall season after we are 
used to warm weather in summer than in the spring season after we have adapted to a 
colder temperature in the winter. People’s action also depends on the status quo or 
reference point and beliefs about the status quo rights over the forest resource may be an 
important factor affecting the choice of cooperation in the JFM program. If the people of 
a village believe that they have the right over forest resources, they may not be willing to 
enter into a bargain with the forest department which makes their right to use of forest 
products contingent upon the achievement of a certain targeted level of forest 
conservation.  
 
4.2.3.3 Loss Aversion 
People have asymmetric valuations of losses and gains and it has been observed that 
people value loss more than an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Experimental studies on common-pool resources also show that the level of cooperation 
is greater in an appropriation game than in a provision game. An explanation for such an 
observation could be that people see cooperation (reducing the level of resource 
extraction) in the appropriation game as a reduction in potential gain and the contribution 
towards the provision of a common-pool good may be seen as a loss in reference to the 
status quo. This concept is also related to the idea of status quo reference point and it is   39
important to bear in mind the initial reference level in this explanation. The initial wealth 
of the individual participating in the appropriation or provision problem could have a 
significant influence on the outcome. 
 
In the case of collective management of forests we would want to investigate whether 
people in a given village or FPC view the effect of the policy introduced under the JFM 
program as a potential gain or a cost to gain access to forest resources. In order to elicit 
this information we could enquire whether the members of the FPCs view the recognition 
of their role in forest protection as an entitlement that increased their opportunities or if 
their forest protection services were viewed as a cost to maintain their traditional access 
rights to forest products on which the depended heavily. Further, we could ask whether 
the people felt that they worked with the Forest Department (FD) or for the FD.   
 
4.2.3.4 Framing Effects 
The manner in which the problem is framed also affects the behavior of the actors. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) show that different descriptions of the same problem can 
lead to different preferences. This suggests that it could be possible to change preferences 
and behavior by changing the manner in which a policy is presented. In keeping with the 
concept of loss aversion it has been noticed that players react differently when the 
problem is framed as a potential loss or a potential gain even if the expected value is 
identical in both cases. The status quo or a reference point also provides a frame that 
affects decision-making. Bowles (1998) suggests that institutions frame the situation 
under which transactions take place and peoples’ choice may vary depending on whether   40
the set of feasible choices was generated through a market like structure or not. The 
literature on community based natural resource management also suggests that growing 
market integration has an adverse impact on the management of common-pool resources. 
The main arguments are that the growth of markets will increase the demand for forest 
related products and an exposure to increased cash exchanges creates an incentive for 
local users to increase their levels of extraction (Agarwal, 2001). An alternative 
explanation could be that the inherent nature of a market structure stimulates profit-
maximizing behavior, which when combined with the HEC nature of the resource leads 
to over exploitation. One of the characteristics of market structures is that it alienates the 
participants and thereby makes self-interest the prevailing preference. A market structure 
also immediately brings about an evaluation of benefits and costs of possible bargains. 
Framing the problem of collective action in a way that invokes notions of responsibility 
and commitment towards the resource may lead to higher levels of cooperation. Even 
under a market like setting, the perception of members of the group as sellers or buyers in 
the bargain will frame their behavior.  
 
In the case of the Joint Forest Management Program, the bargain may be communicated 
in a way that the village communities feel that in order to avail any benefits from the 
forest resources, they need to offer their services in protecting the forest cover. They need 
to pay a price and would want to recover benefits to cover the cost. Alternatively, if the 
program is communicated as an offer a share in the proceeds from the sale of the timber 
that is harvested in return for the services of the community it could be construed as an 
additional benefit in addition to retaining all the customary rights that the villagers held   41
thus far. To understand the impact of framing effects, we would have to elicit information 
about the manner in which the policy proposal was framed in villages where different 
outcomes were observed. It would also be useful to investigate whether framing a policy 
under a market-like structure leads to a different behavior as compared to an 
administrative setting or a setting that invokes mutual care among the members of the 
group and a sense of duty or commitment towards the community’s resource. Some 
accounts of successful case studies note the important role of the Forest Department 
Officer’s role in gaining the trust of local people through invoking a sense of belonging 
for the resource by pointing out that the FD officials are only temporarily appointed in 
the area and have no personal interest in the forest resource and it is the villagers who are 
going to be associated with the forest and its resources over a long period of time (Faust, 
1998; Joshi, 1999).  
 
The person who interacts with the members of the village can also frame their response 
towards the JFM program. Communication of the new policy through a FD 
representative, who has developed a good understanding with the local people in the past, 
is more likely to lead to cooperation. The entry of a new representative replacing an 
officer with whom the community has had several clashes and unpleasant experiences in 
the past may also increase the possibility of cooperation. The role of leadership in the 
success of collective action has been emphasized in the literature (Baland and Platteau, 
1996). Leaders and people who are highly respected in the village also frame the situation 
and play an important role in influencing people’s behavior. We could try to study the 
effect of the same argument made by the leader of the village and by any other member   42
of the village on the behavior of people in the village. A difference in response, either in 
kind or in degree, would suggest that the frame of leadership goes beyond a rational 
analysis of the argument.  
 
4.3  THE ROLE OF LEARNING 
The essence of this argument is that people learn. The learning process may be an 
outcome of conscious and deliberate effort or may happen at a subconscious level.  The 
standard model of rational self-interest maximization would not hold once we relax the 
assumption of stable, time-invariant preferences. Preferences are endogenous and depend 
on institutions and people learn and update their beliefs and preferences. This form of 
learning is conscious and could be the outcome of communicative action. New 
preferences may be an additional argument in the utility function as analyzed by some 
economic models. However, learning and adaptive behavior could also be the result of a 
sub-conscious process and not a deliberated choice. Such learning models may also be 
useful in understanding the success or failure of collective action in the context of 
managing common pool resources.  
 
4.3.1  ‘Cues’ and ‘fits’ 
Margolis (1987) suggests that cognition is a process of pattern recognition. A cue leads to 
a pattern that suggests a certain meaning and/or action as a response. He argues that 
people do not necessarily calculate the costs and benefits in making a choice. Rather any 
given problem is a cue, which is associated with a pattern that fits the cue and in turn 
leads to an action that is associated with the pattern, and the action then feeds back into   43
the environment in the form of another cue. The process of learning involves identifying 
new patterns using the existing stock of patterns that the brain has stored or making new 
connection of cues with existing patterns. According to this model, behavior is a result of 
pattern recognition and a cue leads to an action as a response to a pattern that just “fits” 
the cue. Experimental studies suggest that assigning individuals to arbitrary groups, 
which may be transient, increases the level of cooperative behavior (Cook and Karp, 
1994). It would be difficult to explain such behavior on the basis of rational calculation. 
We could, however, argue that being recognized as a member of a group, even if the 
group is arbitrary and transient, is a cue to which the response of cooperating within the 
group just ‘fits’. Any new policy is a cue, and in order to increase the level of cooperation 
in achieving a common goal, the cue must lead to a pattern to which cooperation is the 
response that fits. 
 
For the success of collective action, it is necessary that the cue given by the new policy 
suggestion gets associated with patterns that are generalized among the group of 
members. This would therefore depend on commonly held beliefs and norms that are 
historically formed. In many parts of India there are 30 to 40 villages that come together 
for religious discourses and other social events. However, when an NGO in Rajasthan, 
tried to use this institutional arrangement as a platform to encourage discussions on how 
the forests and other resources could be commonly managed, the village chiefs’ did not 
think it would work. Though the availability of a meeting point where common issues 
could be discussed seems conducive for successful collective action, the idea of   44
discussing the management of common resources that are shared by many of the villages 
in a religious meeting just did not ‘fit’.  
 
A lot of research in social psychology has focused on the effects of priming on an 
individual’s impressions of others. “Priming refers to the incidental activation of 
knowledge structures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational 
context” (Bargh, Chen and Burrows, 1996). Psychological studies have shown that the 
recent use of a trait construct or stereotype can exert an unintended passive influence on 
the interpretation of behavior. Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) argue that behavioral 
attitudes and reactions can be triggered automatically, without conscious intention or 
awareness, by the mere presence of relevant objects and events. They conducted an 
experiment where participants were asked to play a game that tests their language ability. 
They were presented 30 sets of 5 scrambled words with which they had to construct 
grammatically correct 4 word sentences. Three versions of the game were constructed – 
one that primed the construct rude, another the construct polite and the third was intended 
to prime neither trait. At the end of the game the participants were asked to go to the 
experimenter who would direct them to the next short experimental task. The study found 
that after playing the game, subjects who had been exposed to the rude construct quickly 
interrupted the experimenter who was in a conversation whereas subjects who were 
exposed to the polite construct took longer to interrupt the experimenter to get further 
instructions. However, at the end of the experiment when the participants were de-briefed 
they were not aware that their behavior was influenced by the exposure to words they 
saw on the computer screen.    45
 
In the case of participatory management, the manner in which the policy is proposed and 
the person who initiates the process also could be a cue that automatically gets associated 
with certain patterned responses. The language used to communicate the objective of the 
program and the choice of words in presenting the new policy to the members of a village 
frames this cue.  If there have been several clashes between the forest department officers 
and the village people in the past, a new policy proposed by the forest department could 
automatically prompt a negative response from the village people. Most of the 
psychological studies have been done using controlled experiments. It would be far more 
difficult to conduct a social experiment that could identify similar behavioral responses in 
the villages. However, information from past records about various communications and 
interactions between the forest department and the local people and the observed 
responses may help identify some patterns that could influence the level of cooperative 
behavior.   
 
4.3.2  Stimulus-Response-Behavior (SRB) Model 
Stimulus-response behaviorism is an important perspective in social psychological 
research that suggests that people respond to stimulus and operant conditioning. Operant 
conditioning works on the behavioral response and either reinforces it or reduces the 
behavior. A stimulus leads to a corresponding behavior, which creates a feedback into the 
environment. This feedback may reinforce the behavior and may lead to increased 
adoption of the behavior. Learning occurs through reinforcement and replication of the 
behavior. A reward for desired behavior is called approach conditioning and is likely to   46
induce more of the observed behavior. A punishment for undesirable behavior is called 
avoidance conditioning and is intended to reduce such behavior (Slawski, 1981). This 
model is based on “seeing that” rather than the “reasoning why” concept that underlies 
most incentive based approaches to induce as change in behavior. Skinner (1971) 
observed that positive reinforcers are more likely to replicate the desired behavior as 
compared to punishments or negative reinforcers. He argues that people try to find way to 
avoid punishment without altering their own behavior whereas a positive reinforcement 
of desired behavior can motivate increased adoption of that behavior. Positive 
reinforcements strengthen the connection between a stimulus and response and the 
connection is retained in the memory of the individual. This then gets replicated in 
similar situations leading what Skinner calls ‘stimulus generalization’.  
 
The introduction of the JFM policy in 1989, following the success of the Arabari 
experiment can be seen as a positive reinforcement using Skinner’s classification. The 
formal security of land tenure, share in profits, and user rights to NFTP act as rewards for 
desired behavior rather than a punishing illegal logging under the state control regime 
and could encourage increased conservation efforts by the people. However, when we are 
considering social behavior, the same stimulus can act as a negative or a positive 
reinforcer depending on the existing beliefs and attitudes of the people. In the case of the 
village of Kojon ka Guda in Rajasthan, it was observed that the introduction of the JFM 
program led to serious conflicts between FPCs regarding the area of forest covered under 
each FPC. The boundaries of forest area under each Forest Protection Committee were 
decided by the Forest Department. The nature of the resource is such that there are   47
multiple users and uses. The boundaries that were drawn kept some villages that were 
traditionally using a given part of the forest outside the collective. Even though the 
village was assigned another part of the forest area, the long established customary rights 
and beliefs were hard to change. The legal assignment of rights is not sufficient when 
peoples’ beliefs and perceptions of their rights over the resource conflict with the formal 
institutions (Kashwan, 2004). A market-based argument however would be that once the 
two villages were assigned rights to specific parts of the forest area, they can engage in 
mutually beneficial trade of the forest produce. This argument breaks down when 
people’s beliefs about their rights are in conflict because if people consider themselves 
the owner of an opportunity they would not be willing to buy what they think is already 
theirs. Similarly, in Pakhi, a village in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where village boards 
(Van Panchayats) were very successful in managing the local forests, the introduction of 
the JFM program with a view of achieving uniformity in the forest policy across states 
resulted in the disempowerment of women and the poorer groups who were actively 
participating in the management process under the Van Panchayat. The top-down manner 
of planning and implementation of the participatory program resulted in clashes and 
eventually the collapse of a well functioning process (Sarin, 2001). The same policy, 
which was seen as a positive reinforcer in the Arabari case may not act as a positive 
reinforcer in the village in Rajasthan since the demarcation of formal boundaries by the 
Forest Department conflicts with the customary beliefs of the people and may be viewed 
as a negative reinforcer. Similarly, in the village of Pakhi the introduction of a formal 
participatory policy acted as a negative reinforcer and led to the reduction in cooperative 
behavior.     48
Gender related aspects 
In India women undertake most of the work related to the collection of fuel wood and 
other non-timber forest products and women are also engaged in the activities of making 
products like baskets, plates, brooms etc. from the forest products that are sold in the 
markets in cities. The engagement of women in most forest related activities has led to 
the establishment of rules requiring the recruitment of women to the executive board of 
the FPC in many states in order to increase the participation of women in the decision 
making process. This could also be a positive reinforcement, which by enhancing the role 
of women in social issues, could lead to increased involvement and initiative by women’s 
groups in other related issues. The development of seed banks and other cooperatives in 
many villages in India that have led to empowerment of women suggests that the formal 
recognition of the role of women in the participatory management efforts can act as a 
positive reinforcer. However, it has also been observed that in many villages the women 
members of the executive committee do not actively participate in the decision making 
process and are often not present at the executive committee meetings. Some studies 
indicate this is due to the lack of attention to their opinion in the decisions of the 
committee. The feeling that their representation on the executive committee is not 
recognized during the decision making process could act as a negative reinforcer and 
would lead to reduced participation of women.  
 
The SBR model and the model of pattern recognition offer an explanation for the success 
or failure of JFM efforts using an approach documenting reinforcement in the past rather 
than the forward reasoning approach followed by many previous studies. Identifying   49
generalized patterns and stimuli can inform policy makers about possible cues and 
reinforcers that could lead to increased cooperation. It is not an easy exercise to identify 
general patterns in each village but information about past responses to policies, records 
of Panchayat board meetings and information about people’s attitudes towards the Forest 
Department can provide a starting point. The arguments presented above illustrate that 
the factors that influence behavior are very context specific.  Designing a survey to elicit 
information about behavioral patterns is a challenging task, particularly because the 
manner in which questions are asked is also likely to frame the responses. Further, it is 
important to note that there could still be a gap between people’s beliefs and attitudes and 
their behavior. However, an understanding of some of the psychological factors that may 
influence behavior may enable policy makers to design policies in a manner that is more 
likely to achieve the desired behavior.   50
CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CHOICE MODEL 
This paper argues that the rational-choice model based on the representative, self-
interested individual who maximizes utility after a benefit-cost evaluation of alternative 
options is insufficient in explaining collective action. The homo economicus assumption 
on which traditional economic analysis rests has been challenged by works in social 
psychology and it is now acknowledged that behavior may not always be guided by self-
interest. Economic analyses have tried to incorporate notions of fairness, altruism, and 
sympathy as additional arguments in the utility function, thereby retaining the model of 
utility maximization. This paper takes the analysis one step further and argues that people 
may not always make a conscious, calculated decision and therefore there is a need to 
reconsider the universal applicability of the rational-choice model. The model of pattern 
recognition and stimulus-response behaviorism may be useful in furthering the analysis. 
Margolis (1987) suggests that behavior is the outcome of pattern recognition. Cues from 
the environment get associated with patterns that fit a certain behavior response. It may 
not be possible to explain how this ‘fit’ takes place. However, a better understanding of 
generally observed patterns of behavior may suggest cues in which we can expect similar 
behavioral responses. The arguments presented in this paper suggest that the analysis of 
collective action needs to be very context specific. The examples of the village of Pakhi 
in Uttar Pradesh and Midnapur in West Bengal show that the same policy or cue can lead 
to contrasting outcomes. The formal recognition of local participation in through the JFM 
program was a positive reinforcer in West Bengal but acted as a negative reinforcer in 
Uttar Pradesh, where the well functioning van panchayat system collapsed after the   51
formal introduction of JFM program. These arguments do not imply that the rational-
choice model never holds but suggest that the conventional model may not always be 
applicable. It is not a suggestion that there is a need to replace existing theory with an 
alternative, universally applicable theory. Rather, the point of this paper is that there may 
not be any universally applicable theory of human behavior and there is a need to step 
outside the domain of the rational choice theory and look for other possible explanations.  
 
Insights from behavioral theories can further the analysis of collective action in two 
ways. Firstly, identifying and understanding relevant behavioral regularities, such as 
endowment effects, loss aversion and framing, among the group of resource users can be 
helpful in explaining the outcome of collective action efforts. Secondly, people learn new 
preferences and new connections between cues and responses. Behavior is influenced by 
framing effects and an understanding of how a group responds to different policy frames 
can inform policy makers to design and present the policy in a way that is more likely to 
reinforce desired behavior. Institutions frame the situation under which people act and 
preferences can also be endogenous to the institutional structure. A market-like structure 
may frame the policy cue in a way that leads to self-interest maximizing behavior 
whereas an institutional structure that is framed in a way that invokes a sense of 
belonging and responsibility to the resource may lead to higher levels of cooperation. 
Therefore, the analysis can be taken a step ahead from identifying conditions for 
successful collective action to designing policies in a manner that could lead to the 
establishment of the institutional attributes in groups that do not already have them. This 
does not suggest that it is always possible to design community based natural resource   52
management programs that would be successful. However, information about behavioral 
patterns and attitudes of the group can compliment institutional design principles.  
 
Identifying behavioral patterns is not easy and requires further research. A first step in 
this direction is suggested here. Survey research could be directed towards gathering 
information on the attitudes and feelings of the group of resource users rather than focus 
only on objective performance outcomes. Emotions may be a reason for people to stop 
their benefit-cost calculation and jump directly to the action. Interviews with the 
members of FPCs can be helpful in understanding whether non-cooperation with the 
forest department is an outcome of anger and a feeling of unfair treatment or discontent 
regarding the forest department’s concern towards the interests of the local users of the 
forest. Inquiry into the beliefs of people regarding their right over the forest resource can 
explain whether endowment effects and loss aversion are relevant in the performance 
outcome. To elicit such information interviewers could ask members of FPCs if the 
recognition of their role in forest management under the JFM program was viewed as an 
entitlement that increased their opportunities or as a cost to maintain their traditional 
access rights and whether they felt they were working with the Forest Department (FD) or 
for the FD. Framing effects can significantly influence behavior and some of the frames 
that could be considered are whether the policy was proposed under a market-like setting. 
Even under a market structure, the perception of the members of the FPC as sellers or 
buyers of an opportunity will frame their behavior. The person who communicates the 
policy can also influence the actions of members of the village. It would be worth   53
investigating the responses under different frames and reviewing records of how the JFM 
policy was framed in different states could help explain the performance better.  
 
The next step towards explaining collective action in natural resource management would 
be to include a behavioral study as part of the diagnostic action research, which is aimed 
at understanding the context specific characteristics of the resource and the resource users 
before the introduction of any new policy. Designing a survey to elicit information about 
behavioral aspects discussed above is not easy and requires further research. It is 
important to note that the manner in which the questions are framed also influence 
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